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Introduction
1 In 2007 the global financial system almost came to a standstill. In the following years
states all across the Western world ‘saved’ their financial systems first through rescuing
domestic banks with trillions of euros and dollars in state support and guarantees, and
then through loose monetary policies  aiming to spur debt-fueled economic recovery.
Belgium, with its large, internationally orientated domestic banks, experienced similar
problems. Two of the three largest Belgian commercial banks: Fortis and Dexia had not
only become true global players with international assets of respectively EUR674 billion
and  EUR567  billion  late  2006,  they  also  had  made  highly  leveraging  their  activities
through interbank lending crucial for the realization of their ambitious growth models
(Ardaen, 2012; Chang and Jones, 2013; Depuydt, 2010). Once global capital halted Belgian
banks experienced enormous losses and Fortis and Dexia were nationalized. Moreover, as
part of the Eurozone, Belgium followed the general cure for the Great Financial Crisis
(hereafter GFC) prescribed by the European Central Bank of quantitative easing and low
interest rates stimulating a debt-fueled recovery especially through stimulating trade in
financial assets on financial markets and capital intensive activities such as real estate
markets. Although Belgium had a shared ‘European experience’ with the crash of its stock
markets and banking sector, the GFC did not set in motion the steep and deep economic
crisis that so many other European countries experienced.
2 In countries were the GFC has had a more devastating effect, critical geographers have
turned their attention towards finance (e.g., Engelen, 2008; Pike and Pollard, 2009). For
them, the credit crunch that has caused the GFC revealed a toxic link between financial
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practices and the built  environment,  in essence,  it  revealed how financial  actors are
deeply motivated to  liquefy illiquid assets  such as  real  estate  to  further  enlarge the
financial sphere (Aalbers, 2012). These scholars conceptualize the rise, and fall or further
intensification (?), of global finance as a structural transformation within capitalism, as a
move towards ‘financialized capitalism’ (Aalbers, 2017; Lapavitsas, 2009; van der Zwan,
2014).  The origination of financialized capitalism relates to the breakdown of Bretton
Woods in the 1970s and waves of financial liberalization and reregulation combined with
digitalization, making finance much more footloose (French et al., 2011; Pryke and Allen,
2000).  As  a  result,  the  size  of  financial  markets  and influence of  financial  actors  on
political  economies  increased  rapidly  into  historically  unprecedented  dimensions
(Lapavitsas, 2009; Hardie and Howarth, 2013; Fernandez and Aalbers, 2016). A rich body of
work has demonstrated empirically how financial actors and financial logics increasingly
shape  practices  in  four  actors  that  are  important  for  the  functioning  of  political
economies: non-financial corporations (Krippner, 2005), households (Martin, 2002), the
state  (Hendrikse,  2015)  and  finance  itself  (Hardie  and Howarth,  2013;  Harmes,  1998)
thereby reshaping domestic political economies.
3 As  a  relatively  recent  phenomenon the  rise  of  financialized capitalism is  shaped  by
context specific elements such as the specific character of domestic institutions, politics
and corporations that steer an economy. Therefore, capitalism is looked at as ‘variegated’
in the sense that it is not only driven by tendencies within global capitalism towards
convergence such as the rise of global finance and the continuous pressure to create new
(financial)  markets.  But,  variegation also points  to  how these general  tendencies  are
shaped by historic  economic geographies into local  specificities  (Brenner et  al.,  2010;
Dixon, 2011). 
4 This brings us back to Belgium. Belgian geographers have developed an extremely rich
scholarship  on  how  socio-economic,  geographical  conditions  morph  capitalism  in  a
specific, Belgian shape, not only through rich studies on firm localization, regionalization
and path dependence (Kesteloot and De Maesschalck, 2001; Oosterlynck, 2010; Vanneste
and Cabus, 2007; Vanthillo and Verhetsel, 2012), but, also through drawing rich historic
geographies of  financial  actors,  for instance showing the strong role of  Francophone
finance (e.g., Société Générale) in ordering Belgian economic space (Buyst, 2011; Kesteloot
and De Maesschalck, 2001; Oosterlynck, 2007; Saey et al., 1988). It is no accident that the
crucial term ‘glocalisation’ – that investigates how global capitalism morphs into specific
localities – was coined by the Belgian geographer Swyngedouw (1992). However, although
a couple of Belgian geographers play important roles in international debates on the rise
of global finance (Bassens et al., 2013; Bassens and van Meeteren, 2014; Fernandez et al.,
2016;  Gonzalez  and Oosterlynck,  2014),  scholarship  on how finance  shapes  Belgium’s
current economic geography are scarce. There is some recent work on financialization
processes related to Brussels, to its Airport (Deruytter and Derudder, 2015) and housing
production  (Romainville,  2017),  but,  to  the  author’s  knowledge,  there  are  no
comprehensive  analyses  at  the  national  scale.  Moreover,  in  contemporary  Belgian
economic geography debates often take place in a parallel way: in separate conference
sessions  and publications  in  French –  more focused on Brussels  and Wallonia  –  and
Dutch/English  –  more  focused  on  Brussels  and  Flanders.  Accordingly,  the  French
literature is less accessible and connected to financialization scholars that tend to publish
in English as the phenomenon originates from Anglo American countries.
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5 Thus, in general, Belgian geographers seem, despite the great financial consequences of
the nationalization of Dexia and Fortis, not to be that interested in researching how the
rise of financialized capitalism shapes the Belgian economic geography. A reason could be
that financialization processes do not appear in Belgium. Indeed, van Loon (2016, 2017ab)
shows that – compared to a highly financialized case as the Netherland – Belgian urban
development and real estate markets have proven to be rather ‘protected’ against the rise
of  financialized  capitalism.  However,  either  as  a  possible  ‘negative  case’  of
financialization showing that the rise of  financialized capitalism is  not universal  and
ubiquitous across  the West  (cf.  Christophers,  2015),  or  as  a  further expansion of  the
financialization debate to Western countries, we are in dire need to take finance more
seriously into our thinking about the Belgian economic geography. 
6 This paper first discusses in more depth the four actors that are crucial in facilitating the
rise  of  financialized  capitalism.  This  enables  to  offer  a  first,  tentative,  quantitative
exploration of the balance sheets of these four actors. Brought in conversation with the
existing literature, this allows to present ideas for further research on how processes of
financialization could relate to the contemporary economic geography of Belgium.
 
The rise of financialized capitalism
7 As briefly discussed above, one way of looking at the rise of financialized capitalism is
through  analysing  how  ‘financial  actors,  markets,  practices,  measurements  and
narratives’ (Aalbers, 2017, p. 3) have become dominant among crucial actors of political
economies, namely non-financial firms (hereafter NFCs), financial institutions, states and
households.  The  financialization  literature  shows  that  this  dominance  leads  to  a
structural transformation of practices within these actors and, consequently, especially
in Anglo-American countries, to a transformation of domestic political economies and
related economic geographies. Accordingly, there is a booming literature on the financial
geography of this change (Bassens and van Meeteren, 2014; Engelen, 2008; French et al.,
2011; Wojcik, 2012). However, financialization is a multilayered and multiscalar process
(cf., van Loon, 2016) and plays out, as discussed below, differently in each actor. 
8 The first actor, the financialization of corporations relates to a transformation of business
models, a qualitative shift whereby the adoption of financial logics prioritizes a focus on
financial profitability over productive investments and long-term growth. Put differently,
‘profit-making occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade
and commodity production’ (Krippner, 2005, p. 181). For example, a car manufacturing
becoming a securitisation machine of car loans. As a consequence, leveraged growth, for
instance  through  mergers  and  acquisitions,  financial  assets  and  complex  financial
instruments such as derivatives become central to business models that aim to boost a
corporation’s value, e.g., reflected through high stock market capitalization (Froud et al.,
2006; Pike and Pollard, 2009). 
9 Second, the financialization of households relates to two developments. First, many states
replaced  government  lending  to  stimulate  the  domestic  economy  with  mortgage
production. In this privatised Keynesianism continuous mortgage-debt production has to
accelerate booms on housing markets boosting consumer confidence and subsequently
real  spending  so  domestic  economies  could  thrive  (Fernandez  and  Aalbers,  2016).
However,  the  extreme  relaxation  of  mortgage  conditions  in  the  United  States  also
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spurred a pyramiding of low quality debt giving birth to an almost meltdown of the global
financial  system  (Aalbers, 2012).  Second,  there  is  a  shift  observable  within  Western
countries whereby the state retreats from the provision of public goods (Martin, 2002).
Households  are  increasingly  responsible  to  manage  their  own  funds  to  provide
themselves  for  schooling,  health  care,  and  pensions  often  allocating  this  task  to
institutional investors whose power has increased tremendously (Dixon and Monk, 2014;
Martin, 2002). 
10 Third,  recent  studies  show how different  state  agencies interact  with this  new era of
financialized capitalism. There is a wealth of empirical case studies showing how local
and national state debt has opened up to financialization tools (Hendrikse, 2015; Lagna,
2015; Weber, 2010). Usually, this involves replacing traditional forms of debt, i.e., bonds,
with more complex forms such as derivatives,  collateralized debt obligations and tax
increment financing, often promising lower debt costs or more attractive debt levels but
in  reality  often  creating  badly  understood  financial  risks  that  can  accumulate  into
sizeable  financial  losses.  But,  waves  of  privatization  and  financialization  have  also
removed the barriers  between public  good provisions –  such as  infrastructure –  and
predatory finance (Allen and Pryke, 2013; Peck and Whiteside, 2016). Consequently, roads
have  become  financial  investments  and water  provision  a  tool  for  complex  debt
generation.  Therefore,  on  the  one  hand  financialization  of  the  state  relates  to
opportunistic  financial  behavior:  ‘how  governments  [i.e.,  state  agencies]  wield  the
market-based  practices  and  technologies  of  financial  innovation  to  pursue  statecraft
objectives’ (Lagna, 2015, p. 1). On the other hand, state agencies become ‘“entangled”
(Ashton et al., 2016) with financial actors in often badly understood ways altering socio-
legal arrangements and policies to accelerate the circulation of capital, revalorise space,
and  increase  market  liquidity...  [financialization]  close[s]  off...  public  debate  on
alternative courses… based on, for example, public investment, social redistribution, and
social justice’ (Gotham, 2014, p. 19).
11 Fourth,  the financialization of  financial  institutions relates to a  couple of  developments.
First, a tendency has been observed whereby banks in many countries started to loosen
their long-term relations with corporations as banks adopted market-oriented business
models based on inter-bank borrowing bypassing depositors as main providers of money.
The creation of growing debt and its trade through global capital markets created large
financial  markets and turned finance into an important source of  profit  (Hardie and
Howarth, 2013). In this regard, housing related debt has become a crucial element of both
banking activities and the functioning of financial systems whereby residential real estate
is conceptualized as crucial collateral (Aalbers et al., 2012; Fernandez and Aalbers, 2016).
In addition, banks started to develop or expand investment banking activities, making
trading  in  listed  and non-listed  firms  an  important part  of  their  business  strategies
(Wojcik,  2012;  Lapavitsas  and  Powell,  2013),  i.e.,  exemplifying  ‘the  rise  of  financial
markets for their own good’ (Aalbers, 2008, p. 149). 
12 Second, as many households have delegated the management of their rising stocks of
financial assets to investment funds, pension funds and insurers, the managers of these
funds, institutional investors, have become important actors in global finance (Dixon and
Monk, 2014). As conventional assets as bonds and securities cannot absorb the influx of
institutional money (Fernandez and Aalbers, 2016), there is pressure on all kinds of ‘raw
materials’, such as non-listed firms (Froud et al., 2006), real estate (van Loon and Aalbers,
2017), and infrastructure (Ashton et al., 2016), to be transformed into financial, tradable
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assets.  Taken together,  the  literature  on the  financialization of  financial  institutions
illustrates how ‘finance is increasingly becoming “decoupled from production to become
an independent power, an autocrat over the real economy”’ (Cox in Aalbers, 2008, p. 149).
13 In  conclusion,  the  ways  in  which  financialization  takes  place  differs  throughout  the
various  actors,  but,  where  financialization  processes  structurally  change  a  political
economy scholars label it as a new era of capitalism: financialized capitalism (Aalbers,
2017;  Lapavitsas,  2009;  van  der  Zwan,  2014).  However,  this  rise  of  financialization
processes has not received proper attention among Belgian geographers yet. Therefore,
the next section quantitatively explores – in a tentative and not empirical way – if the
realm for financialization processes has increased in Belgium.
 
A tentative, quantitative exploration: balance sheets
as heuristic device
14 The discussion above indicates that within the four dimensions of the Belgian political
economy  (i.e.,  households,  state,  banks  and  NFCs)  opportunities  for  financialization
processes could have increased considerably. This section offers a tentative, first attempt
to signal if the realm for financialization processes has increased in Belgium. For doing
so, OECD-data is available that allows to compose consolidated financial balance sheets of
these four actors starting in the mid-1990s.  Using consolidated accounts removes the
‘double counting’  of  the financial  assets  and liabilities  of  sub-actors  or  sub-units.  To
assess the increase relative to the entire economy over time assets and liabilities are
expressed  as  percentage  of  GDP.  To  balance  out  extreme  years  the  data  is  ordered
through 4-year averages. Periods are chosen according the following logics:  first data
available (period I), the rapid expansion of finance in the build up to the GFC (period II),
latest data available/GFC (period III) (cf. Ward et al., n.d.)1. 
15 The  resulting  Figure  1  can  be  seen  as  a  heuristic  device  that  allows  a  quantitative
screening of the changing importance of finance reflected to the increase of financial
assets and liabilities since the mid-1990s. Stylistically,  the discussion of these balance
sheets in the subsequent section is ordered through the four different actors. However, it
is crucial to acknowledge that these actors are interconnected and that the balance sheet
should thus be seen as a device to generate venues for future research. As such, in this
paper the balance sheet is  not used as a research method for empirical,  quantitative
analyses but as a device to create a first, tentative ‘screening’ of possible changes in the
Belgian  economy.  A  more  thorough and robust  quantitative  analysis  inspired  by  for
instance the work of Anderson et al. (2014), Ertürk et al. (2005) and McKenzie (2013) would
be  very  welcome.  Moreover,  the  balance  sheet  offers  a  first,  tentative  quantitative
screening, it does not offers insights on, for instance, the concentration of assets and
liabilities within an actor. For example, although households could look very wealthy,
financial wealth could be concentrated among a select group of people. Neither do the
balance sheets offer information about the motives of the holders of these assets and
liabilities and their geography. Nonetheless, combined with relevant academic literature
the balance sheets do create some interesting insights into the rise of finance within the
Belgian political economy.
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Figure 1. Belgium: financial assets & liabilities-to-GDP first data available (1, 1992-1995) pre-GFC
(2, 2004-2007) post-GFC (3, 2009-2012), 4 year averages.
* no data to give indication for real estate values
Sources: Poullet (2013); Eurostat (2016); OECD (2016)
 
The balance sheet of the Belgian political economy: a
research agenda 
16 Belgium has, compared to other European countries, a high ratio of both financial assets
and liabilities to GDP (Brown et al., 2014). Figure 1 clearly shows that since the mid-1990s
and despite the GFC, in all actors, except the Belgian banks, financial assets and liabilities
have increased stronger than the real economy (i.e., GDP). Also, this stretching of balance
sheets made financial assets roughly 7.5 times larger than Belgian GDP. This confirms that
– in line with general developments described in the financialization literature – finance
has become a crucial element of the Belgian political economy suggesting that the
potential realm for financialization processes has expanded. However, there are only a
few academic studies explaining if and, if so, how this stretching of balance sheets has
enabled financialization processes (e.g., Deruytter and Derudder 2015; Romainville, 2017).
 
Non-Financial Corporations (NFCs)
17 Many NFCs in Belgium receive sizeable equity capital from wealthy Belgian households
who aim to grow their multi-generational wealth in a slow, low-risk manner. This creates
an important barrier to processes of financialization as they tend to use their controlling
stakes  to  set business  strategies  around  predictable  results,  cost  efficiency  and  risk
minimization.  Patient  capital  fed  firms  resist  both  high  levels  of  external  capital  –
therefore they have a relatively low share of loans on their balance sheets – and complex
financial products as it decreases their influence vis-à-vis financial actors. Outsiders are
further kept away by opaque corporate governance that blurs the lines between owners,
directors and managers, but also put a focus on non-financial gains central and these
corporations usually remain relatively small and domestically-oriented (Daems, 1998; van
Loon, 2016, 2017; Molly et al., 2012).
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18 However,  while  these  traditional  features  of  Belgian  NFCs  explain  the  lack  of
financialization within the real  estate sector,  the dramatic  increase of  both financial
assets and liabilities between the pre-financialization and pre-GFC period shown in Figure
1 suggests an increased realm for financialization processes in other sectors. Financial
assets that indicate an increase of mergers and acquisitions as well as an increase of a
focus on financial gains – e.g., (un)quoted shares and loans – have increased considerably.
On the one hand this could be in line with the concept of patient capital which is often
provided through equity and debt (Deeg et al., 2016). However, a case as the listed Ab
Inbev that rapidly grew through aggressively leveraged mergers and acquisitions into the
largest  brewery of  the world begs  for  further  research especially  as,  to  the author’s
knowledge, no case studies on the financialization of Belgian firm(s) have been published
yet. In this regard, work of Lehrer and Celo (2016) – who show a processes of ‘bifurcation’
whereby highly financialized and patient-capital fed firms in Germany co-exist – could be
an inspirational  starting  point  to  enrich our  ideas about  the  role  of  financialization
processes within the economic geography of Belgium. 
 
Households
19 Belgian  households  are  among  the  wealthiest  in  the  world  managing  conservative
household portfolios of savings (‘other deposits’ in Figure 1), equity in listed and non-
listed firms, securities and, in particular low-leveraged residential real estate. Before 2007
household’s financial assets grew steadily and included long-held equity in Belgian firms
as well as domestically-oriented investments in assets that were perceived as safe: i.e.,
Belgian state bonds, and shares in Belgian banks and REITs. Consequently, the financial
crisis hit individual households through their investments in Belgian finance and the
downturn in equity markets. But, also during the GFC through the ECB’s low-interest rate
monetary policy making returns on saving accounts very low. 
20 This large amount of less risk full assets (cf. Ertürk et al., 2005) managed by households
themselves could be an indication for the existence of large stocks of family capital. This
multi-generational wealth looking for sustainable growth is an important type of patient
capital that can function as a barrier to financialization processes (Lehrer and Celo, 2016;
Deeg et al., 2016): to a certain extent, it protects household portfolios from the volatility of
financial markets 
21 Although pensions are mainly provided by the state through a pay-as-you go system
recent reforms combined with an increased sense that the state will not meet all future
financial  obligations  have  made  self-funded  pension schemes  more  popular  (Naczyk,
2012). Hence, there was a strong increase in institutional managed assets (see Figure 1)
indicating a more powerful role for institutional investors within the Belgian political
economy. This opens up an interesting realm for future research, for instance, to develop
geographies  of  these  institutionally  managed  investment  portfolios.  The  literature
suggests  that  this  would  lead  to  the  internationalization  of  household’s  investment
portfolios and shift towards more risky asset categories (Ertürk et al., 2005; Harmes, 1998;
van Loon and Aalbers, 2017).
22 Belgian household debt did not expand in a manner comparable to many other Western
countries  (cf.  Fernandez  and  Aalbers,  2016).  The  steadily  increasing  debt  of  Belgian
households consists mostly of mortgages but despite the steady and strong increase of
property prices and related rise of real estate values the debt-to-GDP ratio is still rather
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low. This relates to a deep culture of housing self-provision in which self-building creates
unique suburban properties putting the desires of the resident (as opposed to market
considerations)  central,  resulting in  households  who tend to  stay put  (Kesteloot  and
Maesschalck, 2001; Vanneste and Cabus, 2007). However, where in the past cheap land
and relax planning regulation spurred this model increased land scarcity and stricter
planning rules has put pressure on this housing model due to rising land costs. Increasing
residential  real estate prices has been further spurred by an increased willingness of
banks that started securitisation programmes to borrow, low interest rates and policy
changes  making  interest  rates  partly  deducible,  making  housing  less  affordable  and
giving rise to more urban forms or residential real estate (Damen et al., 2014; Winters and
van den Broeck, 2016; Romainville, 2017). This makes it quite likely that especially among
first  time  home  buyers  and  in  specific,  more  expensive,  urban  areas  processes  of
financialization could be observed, for instance exemplified through high loan-to-values.
 
State agencies
23 Belgium’s  corporatist  political  system  was  based  on  pillars,  religious  or  ideological
organizations  that encompassed all  spheres  of  life.  It  underwent  a  process  of
regionalization in the 1970s, setting in motion the division of the three main parties into
Dutch and French speaking branches that over time became autonomous organizations.
Public responsibilities and related bureaucracies were transferred to Flanders, Wallonia
and  Brussels  in  successive  waves  of  regionalization,  creating  more  pronounced
divergence in their pathways even as these regions still had to cooperate on many issues.
Finding  such  multiscalar  compromises  is  an  often  time-consuming  and  deadlocked
process,  so  that  economic  restructuring  have  been  ameliorated  as  employers’
organization, labour unions and other corporatist structures organization structures still
play a prominent role in the current devolved state model (Moulaert and Willekens, 1985;
Oosterlynck, 2010; Saey et al., 1988; Vanthillo and Verhetsel, 2012). 
24 The politics behind this re-configuration of the state resulted in the institutionalization
of the ‘double’ compensation measure meaning that an investment into one region or
religion  should  have  an  equivalent  in  the  other  and  until  the  late  1980s  these
regionalizing  policies  were  embedded  in  an  extensive  welfare  system  and  generous
subsidies and investments (see Figure 1 assets equity in/loans to) to support national
sectors as result of the strong unions and industrial interests (Moulaert and Willekens,
1985; Oosterlynck, 2010). As a result, the Belgian state was heavily indebted in the early
1990s (Figure 1) and had to find creative solutions to show it was willing to meet the
Maastricht criteria of state debt below 60% (though it never has). 
25 Attempted solutions to this revolved in a slow pace. They took the form of austerity and
the  privatisation  of  state-owned  financial institutions,  corporations  (particularly
telecoms  and  energy),  and  state  investment  funds:  although  state  agencies  often
remained  important  shareholders  within  these  ‘privatised’  organizations.  Another
solution was found through the adoption of public private partnerships, particularly for
infrastructure projects. This funding structure for a while allowed the state to keep the
expenditure to be kept off-balance sheets and, for the same reason, the Belgian state also
increasingly adopted complex financial instruments such as derivatives from the 1990s
onwards. 
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26 In regard to infrastructure, a recent wave of PhD studies (see Hueskes et al., 2016) shows
how PPP-structures,  that  are  imported  from an  Anglo-American  realm,  often  are  in
conflict with the existing institutional context. This centres our attention to how linkages
between  state  agencies  and  financial  actors  can  change  over  time,  and  it  would  be
extremely interesting to put, in line with the international literature (Allen and Pryke,
2013),  the  financial  dimension  into  this  research  area.  A  study  that  has  done  this,
Deruytter and Derudder (2015),  shows how the sale of  Brussels  Airport  to an Anglo-
American investment fund has transformed a former ‘public good’ into a financial asset.
27 As discussed above, Belgian banks needed heavy state support during the crisis therefore
increasing state debt and making the state a large owner in state firms again. In 2016, the
Belgian state still owns the bank/insurer Belfius (with 176 billion euro of liabilities) and
provides 61 billion euro in guarantees for Dexia. But, there are also structural elements
that  make  the  Belgian  state  heavily  indebted  such  as  a  pay-as-you-go  pension  fund
system combined with an ageing population, an expansive state apparatus and structural
tax avoidance. 
28 However, whereas a more structural exploration about how central and regional state
agencies relate to financialization processes is still lacking, a recent study focussing on
urban development in Flanders (van Loon, 2017a) shows that Flemish municipalities have
a long history of financial autonomy and financial experimentation has been much more
pronounced in the past. In general, Flemish municipalities do not have complex financial
instruments and operate with low and decreasing debt-to-income levels making it hard to
observe the rise of ‘predatory finance’ (Peck and Whiteside, 2016).
 
Financial institutions: banks
29 High household saving rates created a reservoir of deposits that could be used as engine
for  opportunistic  commercial  banking  growth.  Traditionally,  public  credit  agencies
played  a  pivotal  role  in  the  management  of  these  deposits  using  them primarily  to
provide conservative loans against low interest rates. During a wave of privatisation in
the 1990s the public credit agencies merged and the deposits became concentrated within
three listed Belgian banks who all  had ambitious growth models  to which interbank
lending became crucial  (Depuydt,  2010;  Ardaen,  2012).  Fees and commissions became
much more important to the banks’ business models than interest margins on loans and
deposits, and in this period, as Figure 1 shows, banks’ assets and liabilities grew rapidly.
Enabled  by  financial  liberalisation  and  lax  supervision  deposits  and  current  account
surpluses were now used as collateral for leveraged growth thereby making extensive use
of  shadow  banking  businesses  to  attain  credit  from  global  financial  markets  via
structured debt securities with the implication that concentrated geographical risks –
particularly from countries with housing booms – were imported onto the balance sheets
of Belgian banks (Chang and Jones, 2013). As a result of these structural changes to the
Belgian banking industry and the shift in their business models, the portion of ‘safe’ core
tier 1 capital (i.e., cash and transferable deposits in Figure 1) severely decreased up to
2007. 
30 Belgian banks’ reliance on global capital markets through inter-bank lending left them
vulnerable to the financial crisis and in 2008 they suffered enormous losses mostly as the
result  of  write-downs on financial  assets  (Chang and Jones,  2013).  The Belgium state
supported KBC and nationalised Dexia and Fortis that it later sold to French BNPparibas,
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partially reversing the banking system’s privatisation and reversing the growth in the
bank’s  balance sheets.  The most  significant  factor  in  this  is  the sale  of  a  significant
portion  of  the  bank  Dexia’s  assets  following  its  nationalisation.  In  this  process  of
deleveraging banks also decreased their lending to corporations, reflected in the decrease
short and long term loans on asset side of Figure 1. The financialization exemplified to
the switch towards market oriented banking has been described in detail. However, the
connections towards other actors remain under-studied: how does the financialization of
Belgian banks related to NFCs from other actors then real estate? For instance, did/do
Belgian banks also push for the rise of housing finance? And, more general, how has the
shift towards market based banking changed the role of banks shaping the economic
geography of Belgium? 
 
Financialization and Belgian economic geography?
31 As argued above, this century Belgian geographers have been focused much on both the
historic geography of finance (Buyst, 2011; Kesteloot and Maesschalck, 2001; Oosterlynck,
2007, 2010) and the rise of global finance (Bassens et  al., 2013;  Fernandez et al., 2016;
Gonzalez and Oosterlynck, 2014).  Consequently, there is a rich understanding on how
finance  shaped  the  economic  geography  of  Belgium  and  Belgian  scholars  have
contributed to important, international debates. However, the role that contemporary
‘financialized’  finance  (cf.  Van  Loon  and  Aalbers,  2017)  plays,  not  only  as  regular
facilitator of all kinds of socio-spatial processes, but, more importantly, increasingly as a
dominant force that aims to penetrate all kinds of actors and spaces to extract financial
profits from has remained under-studied in the Belgian context. This neglect leads to an
odd situation in which the financial balance sheets of all four important actors of the
Belgian political economy have stretched widely, indicating that there could have been
fertile  ground  for  financialization  processes  to  take  off.  But,  as  case  studies  that
investigate the (non-)originating of financialization process are lacking, the effects of this
enlargement of Belgian finance remain under-studied. 
32 To overcome this, Table 1 summarizes the discussion above and presents ideas for future
research  on  financialization  in  Belgium.  Table  1  should  not  be  looked  at  as  a  fixed
research  agenda  but  more  as  a  device  to  trigger  debate  and  inspiration  for  future
research projects. Also, as financialization relates to multilayered and multiscalar process
the ‘(non-)financialization’ of a certain case does not automatically indicates the (non-
)financialization  of  an  entire  actor.  Table  1  thus  points  to  the  following  research
directions that could help to map out the presence of financialization within the Belgian
context:
33 NFCs: it is crucial to further investigate the workings of patient capital in other sectors
than real estate but also to analyse firms that have probably financialized. If cases of
financialization can be proven then it would be interesting to analyse how financialized
and patient capital fed firms co-exist. For instance through mapping out the localization
patterns of different types of firms to see if, for instance, financialized firms are more
inclined to still concentrate around ‘Francophone’ capital and (global) financial markets
located in Brussels. 
34 Households:  the  balance  sheets  have  stretched  considerably  indicating  the  need  to
research the rise of housing finance (especially among first time house buyers and/or in
rapidly gentrifying areas) and the rise of institutionally managed households portfolio’s.
Financialization within the contemporary economic geography of Belgium
Belgeo, 4 | 2017
10
The quantitative data also suggests that the aggregated assets and liabilities of Belgian
households  have  become more  tied  to  global  capital  markets  and shifted to  ‘riskier’
investment categories. 
35 State agencies: international scholarship points to at least two interesting research venues.
The first is ‘entanglement’ (Ashton et al., 2016) through the adoption of complex financial
instruments or high levels of debt. A first screening at the Flemish municipal level did not
find such a trend in recent decades but did point to interesting more historic research
periods. Antwerp, for instance, came close to bankruptcy in the 1980s as the result of,
among other things, rather opportunistic financial innovation such as redemption free
municipal bonds (van Loon, Oosterlynck and Aalbers, n.d.). However, more thorough in-
depth  studies  focusing  (also)  on  other  regions  and  other  state  agencies  could  be
interesting (see Deruytter, 2016), especially when the focus is on entities that use much
external finance to fund growth ambitions or entities that have to deal with financial
constraints. In this regard, also the central state should be studied: has the Belgian state,
in line with other European countries (cf. Lagna, 2015), turned to financial innovation to
answer demands from the European Commission? The second is privatisation opening
(semi-)public  organizations  up  for  financialization  processes through  comparable
processes as within NFCs thus offering a probably third interesting category in mapping
localisation patterns.
36 Banks: there is some popular and academic work showing clearly the financialization – or
the more market orientated behaviour – of Belgian banks. However, what remains under-
studied is the relationship between these financialized banks and other economic sectors
and geographies. In the real estate sector, for instance, patient capital proved to be a
strong barrier shielding Belgian real estate firms for financialization processes (van Loon,
2016).
37 In conclusion, this paper offers a first exploration on the existence of financialization
processes within the Belgian political economy. Consequently, future studies can help to
map these processes further. A great challenge for doing so is to integrate the French,
Dutch and English literature on economic geography and finance in Belgium and also to
conduct more historical studies.
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Table 1. Studying financialisation in Belgium to develop a ‘new’ Belgian economic geography.
Note: This table contains a gathering of research ideas and not a comprehensive
research agenda.
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NOTES
1. The idea to quantitatively explore the financialisation of political economies through balance
sheets arose during a collective research project with Callum Ward and Gertjan Wijburg:  see
Ward et al. (n.d.) and is inspired by Ertürk et al. (2005). Accordingly, many elements of this paper
resonate  with  Ward  et  al.  (n.d.)  that  also  includes  a  more  extensive  discussion  of  the
methodology.
ABSTRACTS
A  quantitative  screening  shows  that  since  the  1990s  the  financial  assets  and  liabilities  of
important actors of the Belgian political economy have grown considerably. Whereas in other
countries this growth of the financial sphere has been related to a transformation in capitalism
in  which  ‘finance’  becomes  dominant  –  i.e.,  the  rise  of  financialized  capitalism  –  Belgian
scholarship on ‘financialization’ is scarce. Therefore, this paper offers a first exploration on the
ways  in  which  financialization  could  be  observable  in  Belgium  and  consequently  could  be
reshaping  its  economic  geography.  Accordingly,  the  paper  offers  both  an  introduction  on
financialization  in  Belgium and  inspiration  for  debate  and  further  research  for  geographers
studying (elements of) the contemporary economic geography of Belgium. 
Een  kwantitatieve  verkenning  laat  zien  dat  sinds  de  jaren  ’90  financiële  bezittingen  en
verplichtingen van belangrijke domeinen binnen de Belgische politieke economie fors gegroeid
zijn.  Waar  deze groei  in  andere  landen gerelateerd wordt  aan een transformatie  binnen het
kapitalistische  systeem  waarin  ‘finance’  dominant  wordt,  m.a.w.  de  opkomst  van  het
gefinancialiseerd kapitalisme, is in België onderzoek naar ‘financialisering’ schaars. Deze paper
biedt  daarom  een  eerste  verkenning  naar  processen  van  financialisering  in  België  en  hun
potentiële invloed op de Belgische economische geografie. Op die manier vormt deze paper zowel
een  introductie  over  financialisering  in  België  en  levert  de  paper  voer  voor  discussie  (over
toekomstig  onderzoek)  voor  geografen  die  (elementen  van)  de  hedendaagse  economische
geografie van België onderzoeken.
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